The trust you did not check: Notion's vendor, bundled copies of Git and idle Dependabot alerts
Three unrelated announcements on 10 November share a quieter point: in each, the weak spot is not the code a team writes but a party or setting it assumed was handled.
Notion's incident notice is the plainest case. Its inference provider, Fireworks AI, had committed in a contract to keep no data from the calls Notion made, and Notion's investigation found that data had been retained anyway. The promise was real; checking it was nobody's daily job. Notion's response is to audit critical vendors, inference providers and data processors among them, against the retention terms they signed (Notion).
The Git security release has the same shape in software. Six vulnerabilities are fixed in Git 2.56.1 and six backported series, but the advisory does not stop at "update Git". It asks users to update applications that bundle their own copy of Git and installations used by automation that processes repositories for others (GitHub blog). Those copies do not appear when a developer runs git --version, which is exactly why the advisory names them.
GitHub's Dependabot change adds a third variant: a control that turns itself off. From 8 December, repositories with no push, creation or alert activation in a year lose their alerts, archived rather than deleted (GitHub changelog). For a library that still gets installed but no longer gets commits, silence afterwards will mean "nobody is listening", not "nothing is wrong".

What the sources offer as the fix
Each item names its own remedy, and none of them is more care in general. Notion audits vendors against their contracts. The Git advisory lists the hidden copies to update and, failing that, concrete precautions: clone only from trusted servers, avoid recursive clones and merges of untrusted content. GitHub exempts repositories under an enforced security configuration, so an organisation can decide centrally that alerts stay on.
What to take from it
The common step is an inventory of what is trusted without being looked at: which vendors receive data under a promise, which tools carry their own Git, which repositories still ship while nobody pushes. Each of those is a place where the protection exists on paper and fails quietly.